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Abstract
We propose a new class of voting rules, called Size Approval Voting.
According to this rule, the effective weight of a vote from a given indi-
vidual depends on how many other alternatives the very same individ-
ual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to be non-negative
and weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then,
for a given profile of individual votes, all those alternatives with the
maximal sum of weighted votes are elected. We show in our axiomatic
analysis that the family of all Size Approval Voting is characterized
by a set of natural properties.
Keywords: Approval Voting, Characterization.
JEL-Number: D71.
1 Introduction
In a lot of social choice settings individual preferences on the set of alterna-
tives are not extracted by means of a direct revelation mechanism, instead
individuals are asked to vote for one or more of the alternatives that stand
for election. The winning alternative(s) is (are) then determined by means
of a voting rule, an aggregator of the individual voting decisions.
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Approval Voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn [4], is one of the
most important voting rules both in theory and practice. According to it,
every individual can vote for as many alternatives as s/he wishes to and
all alternatives with the highest number of votes are elected. One critique
on Approval Voting has been its indeterminacy; that is, for most ordinal
preference profiles, any alternative could possibly win the election (see Saari
and van Newenhizen [15] and [16]). The underlying intuition of this result is
that, in this case, the set of undominated (sincere) strategies under Approval
Voting rather large and, therefore, it is impossible to know a priori which set
of alternatives an individual finally votes for. Brams et al. [6] argue however
that the indeterminacy of Approval Voting is not a major drawback, simply
because the actual voting decisions reveal some information about cardinal
utilities. For cardinal utilities, at least two different definitions of sincerity
have been provided. The weak version of sincerity - if some alternative is
approved all alternatives that give a higher cardinal utility should also be
approved - has been characterized by Brams and Fishburn [5] and Nurmi
[14]. The strong version of sincerity - an alternative is approved if and only
if its cardinal utility is higher than average cardinal utility of all alternatives
- has been studied by Hoffman [10], Merrill [12], Merrill and Nagel [13],
and Ballester and Rey-Biel [3]. In fact, the latter authors show that if an
individual does not have any information about the preferences of others
and the electorate is large, then s/he will be strongly sincere under Approval
Voting.
The amount of cardinal information individuals can transmit through
their votes depends on the proper voting rule. For example, if the Plural-
ity Rule was applied instead of Approval Voting, individuals will, under the
same assumptions as above, always vote for their best alternative as above
and, consequently, no information about the utility of the second best alter-
native is collected. Since in different situations society may want to take into
account distinct degrees of information about cardinal utilities, it is our ob-
jective to characterize axiomatically a general class of voting rules that allows
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the decision maker to vary the individual incentives to approve alternatives
beyond their best alternative.1
The class of voting rules we propose, Size Approval Voting, is as follows:
Assign a non-negative weight to each vote depending on the number of al-
ternatives this individual votes for. In particular, weights are assumed to
be weakly decreasing in the number of approved alternatives. Then, for all
profiles of individual votes, the alternatives with the highest sum of weighted
votes are elected. It is easy to see that the class of all Size Approval Voting
encompasses a variety of well-known voting rules. It reduces to a k-Approval
Voting if the weight is zero for all subsets larger than k and strictly posi-
tive and identical for all subsets with a size of at most k. Observe that the
Plurality Rule and Approval Voting correspond to the extreme cases of a
k-Approval Voting and, therefore, they are included in our family.
To see why the class of all Size Approval Voting can be thought of as a
variety of possibilities of incorporating cardinal information in the aggrega-
tion process, consider again the case of three alternatives. If we exclude the
special case of the constant rule (always elect all alternatives), any Size Ap-
proval Voting is representable by the vector of weights w = (1, p, 0), where
p ∈ [0, 1]. Here, p refers to the weight of each vote of an individual who
approves exactly two alternatives. If p = 0, individuals will only approve
one alternative. This rule corresponds therefore to the Plurality Rule. In
the other extreme, p = 1, the rule coincides with Approval Voting. Conse-
quently, under the same assumptions of complete uncertainty as presented
by Ballester and Rey-Biel [3], higher values of p induce more incentives to
approve the second best alternative since the cost of approving one more al-
ternative gets smaller. However, higher values of p imply also that the voting
rule ignores in the aggregation process the possibly not small differences in
the utility of the two voted alternatives.
1As a simple example consider the case when there are three complementary alterna-
tives for election. In a single-seat election, the Plurality Rule would do fine. However, in
a multi-seat election the information Approval Voting provides about the utility of second
best alternative may just be too important to be missed.
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In our axiomatic analysis, we are interested in general voting procedures
that could operate in different voting situations in which the set of voters
might vary (for instance, different choices have to be made over time). In
particular, and given a universal set of potential voters, a voting procedure
should specify an outcome (a non-empty subset of the given set of alterna-
tives) for every electorate (the subset of voters that indeed vote). In this
setting, we apply the following properties in order to characterize all Size
Approval Voting: First, Consistency in Voters states that (i) if an alterna-
tive is not elected by some electorate and does not receive any vote from a
disjoint electorate, then the alternative is not elected whenever the two elec-
torates are assembled and (ii) if a common subset of alternatives is elected by
two disjoint electorates, then exactly this set of alternatives has to be elected
whenever all individuals within and no individual outside these two elec-
torates participates in the election. Second, Anonymity is symmetry across
voters. Third, Neutrality is symmetry across alternatives. Fourth, Contrac-
tion states that if one individual reduces the set of alternatives s/he approves
and some of the alternatives this individual still votes for have been elected
originally, then, at the new situation, these alternatives are still elected and
no alternative that originally has not been elected gets elected. Fifth, No-
Veto means that no electorate is able to change completely the opinion of a
sufficiently large sequence of electorates with the same opinion.
Our work also contributes to the already existing literature on axiomatic
voting theory. Among others, Fishburn [7] and [8], Sertel [17], Baigent and
Xu [2], Goodin and List [9], and Vorsatz [19] study the axiomatic properties
of Approval Voting. Alo´s-Ferrer [1] shows that the axioms in the character-
ization in [7] are not independent. Finally, to our best knowledge, the only
existing attempt to generalize Approval Voting is due Masso´ and Vorsatz
[11]. The authors relax the neutrality axiom and characterize the class of all
Weighted Approval Voting. This class of voting rule takes as given a strictly
positive weight for every alternative and a complete preorder (a complete, re-
flexive, and transitive binary relation) on the set of alternatives. Now, given
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a profile of individual votes, the alternative for which the product of ex-ante
weight times the number of votes is maximal is elected. In case the product
is maximal for more than one alternative the complete preorder is applied as
a tie-breaking rule.
We proceed as follows: In the next section, we introduce basic notation
and definitions. Afterwards, we present and discuss the properties that we
use in our characterization. In Section 4, we prove our main result and, in
Section 5, we establish the independence of the axioms.
2 Notation and Definitions
We consider situations in which a set of individuals, which is taken to be
variable, has to decide upon the election of a subset of a given set of al-
ternatives. Formally, let X be the set of alternatives for election. Generic
alternatives will be denoted by x, y, and z, larger subsets of X by S and T .
The cardinality of X, |X|, is finite and greater or equal to 2. We represent
the universal set of individuals by the set of natural numbers N. The set of
individuals actually participating in the election, the electorate N , is a finite
subset of the natural numbers. Often we will also use the capital letters A
and B to denote electorates.
For any individual i ∈ N, let Mi ∈ 2X be the set of alternatives i votes
for. A profile M = (Mi)i∈N ∈ (2X)N is a list of all votes. Given a profile
M and an electorate N , a response profile MN = (Mi)i∈N ∈ (2X)N is the
n-tuple of votes coming from the electorate N at profile M . We say that the
response profiles MA and M
′
B, corresponding to the electorates A and B of
equal size, are isomorphic if there exists a one-to-one mapping pi : A → B
such that for all i ∈ A, Mi = M ′pi(i). Given two disjoint electorates A and
B and two response profiles MA and MB, denote by MA +MB the response
profile (Mi)i∈A∪B ∈ (2X)A∪B. Finally, given a response profile MN , a set
of maximal sub-electorates is taken to be a partition N1, . . . , Nn of N such
that for all Nm with m ∈ {1, ..., n} it is the case that Mk ∩Ml = ∅ for all
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k, l ∈ Nm and (
⋃
i∈Nm Mi) ∩Mk 6= ∅ for all k 6∈ Nm. Intuitively, a set of
maximal sub-electorates decomposes N into subgroups of individuals with
the property that in each subgroup every alternative receives at most one
vote and it is impossible to construct a coarser partition of N .
Given an electorate N , a voting rule vN : (2X)N → (2X \ ∅) selects for all
profiles M a nonempty set of feasible alternatives vN(M) with the property
that for all M,M ′ ∈ (2X)N such that MN = M ′N , vN(M) = vN(M ′). Then,
with a slight abuse of notation, we will write v(MN) instead of v
N(M). A
family of voting rules {vN : (2X)N → 2X \ ∅}N is a set of voting rules,
one for every electorate N . It is denoted by v. Finally, given a response
profile MN and a permutation µ : X → X, let µ(MN) and µ(v(MN)) be the
response profile and the set of elected alternatives obtained when alternatives
are permuted according to µ.
To define the class of all Size Approval Voting, let R+ and R++ be the sets
of non-negative and strictly positive real numbers, respectively. Similarly,
let Q be the set of rational numbers. Given k ∈ N such that 0 < k ≤ |X|,
the response profile MN , and alternative x ∈ X, Gk(MN , x) = |{i ∈ N :
x ∈ Mi and |Mi| = k}| denotes the support of size k to x at MN . Then,
Gx(MN) =
∑|X|
k=1G
k(MN , x) is referred to as the support of x atMN . Finally,
given a response profile MN , two alternatives x, y ∈ X, and two natural
numbers k, l ∈ {1, ..., |X|}, Fx,y(MN ; k, l) = Gk(MN ,x)Gl(MN ,y) denotes the relative
support of size k to x at MN with respect the support of size l to y at MN .
Definition 1 The family of voting rules v is a Size Approval Voting if there
exists a vector of weights w = (wk)k≤|X|, with wk ∈ R+ and wk ≥ wk+1 for
all k, such that for all profiles M ∈ (2X)N and all electorates N ,
x ∈ v(MN)⇔
|X|∑
k=1
wk ·Gk(MN , x) ≥
|X|∑
k=1
wk ·Gk(MN , y) for all y ∈ X.
The class of all Size Approval Voting encompasses some well known fam-
ilies of voting rules. For example, if there exists a p ∈ {1, ..., |X|} such that
wk = wk−1 > 0 for all k ≤ p and wl = 0 for all wl > p, then the considered
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family of voting rules is a p-Approval Voting; that is, votes are effective if
and only if an individual approves at most p alternatives. Approval Voting
(p = |X|) and the Plurality Rule (p = 1) are special cases of a p-Approval
Voting. The constant rule is obtained when wk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., |X|}.
3 Properties and Characterization
In this section, we introduce the axioms and present our main Theorem.
The following consistency property requires the satisfaction of two condi-
tions. First, if an alternative is not elected from an electorate A and it does
not receive any vote from the disjoint electorate B, then it should be not
elected if the two electorates are assembled. Second, if two disjoint elec-
torates elect some common alternatives, then exactly these alternatives are
elected when whenever all individuals within and no individual outside these
two electorates participates in the election. The latter condition has been
suggested first by Smith [18].
Consistency in Voters: The family of voting rules v is consistent in
voters if for all profiles M ∈ (2X)N and all disjoint electorates A,B ⊂ N,
(i) x 6∈ v(MA) and x 6∈Mi for all i ∈ B ⇒ x 6∈ v(MA +MB)
(ii) v(MA) ∩ v(MB) 6= ∅ ⇒ v(MA +MB) = v(MA) ∩ v(MB).
Anonymity states that the set of elected alternatives is immune to per-
mutations of individuals.
Anonymity: The family of voting rules v is anonymous if for all isomorphic
response profiles MA and M
′
B,
v(MA) = v(M
′
B).
Similarly, Neutrality requires that the labels of the alternatives do not
matter.
Neutrality: The family of voting rules v is neutral if for all profiles M ∈
(2X)N, all electorates N , and all permutations µ : X → X,
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µ(v(MN)) = v(µ(MN)).
The next property, contraction, considers the situation when one individ-
ual reduces the set of alternatives s/he votes for. In particular, it is asked
that if some of the alternatives in the reduced set were elected in the original
situation, then these alternatives are still elected and any alternative that
has not been elected originally is still not elected.
Contraction: The family of voting rules v satisfies contraction if for all
profilesM,M ′ and all electorates N such thatM ′j ⊆Mj ( X for some j ∈ N ,
Mi =M
′
i for all i ∈ (N \ {j}), and v(MN) ∩M ′j 6= ∅,
M ′j ∩ v(MN) ⊆ v(M ′N) ⊆ v(MN).
The last property, No-Veto, states that if there exists a succession of
disjoint electorates such that S is the set of elected alternatives for each
electorate, the addition of any outside electorate in which no alternative of S
is elected to a sufficiently large number of the former electorates is not able
to change totally the original set of elected alternatives.
No-Veto: The family of voting rules v satisfies no-veto if for all profilesM ∈
(2X)N, all successions of disjoint electorates {Ni}i∈N such that v(MNi) = S
for all i ∈ N, and any other electorate A for which A ∩ Ni = ∅ for all i ∈ N
and v(MA) ∩ S = ∅, there exists an integer k ∈ N such that
v(MN1 +MN2 + . . .+MNk +MA) ∩ S 6= ∅.
The main result of our paper is a characterization of the family of all Size
Approval Voting by means of these properties.
Theorem 1 The family of voting rules v satisfies Consistency in Voters,
Anonymity, Neutrality, Contraction, and No-Veto if and only if v is a Size
Approval Voting.
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4 Proof of the Theorem
In this section, we present the proof of our main result. Lemma 1 shows that
there exists a non-negative real number p such that if an electorate consists
of an unique individual who votes for more than p alternatives, then the set
of elected alternatives by v is X, whereas the set of approved alternatives by
the individual is elected by v if this set has at most p alternatives.
Lemma 1 Suppose that the family of voting rules v satisfies Consistency
in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, Contraction, and No-Veto. Then, there
exists a p ∈ [0, |X|) such that for all profiles M and all i ∈ N (i) |Mi| > p if
and only if v(Mi) = X and (ii) 0 < |Mi| ≤ p if and only if v(Mi) =Mi.
Proof: Take any v that satisfies the hypothesis of the Lemma. Consider
any profile M and any individual i ∈ N such that Mi 6= ∅. By Neutrality
and the fact that v(Mi) 6= ∅, v(Mi) ∈ {{Mi}, {X \Mi}, {X}}. To show that
v(Mi) 6= (X \Mi), suppose otherwise. We consider two different cases:
(i) Suppose that |Mi| ≥ |X|2 . If Mi = X, then v(Mi) = X by Neutrality.
IfMi 6= X, take any T ⊂ X such that |T | = |Mi| and (X \T )∩ (X \Mi) = ∅.
Such a set T must exist. Consider now any profile M ′ such that M ′1 = Mi
and M ′j = T for all j 6= 1. By Anonymity, v(M ′1) = v(Mi) = (X \ Mi).
Anonymity, Neutrality, and the assumption v(Mi) = (X \Mi) imply together
that v(M ′j) = (X \ T ) for all j 6= 1. Thus, v(M ′1) ∩ v(M ′j) = ∅ for all j 6= 1.
Consequently, by No-Veto, there exists t ∈ N such that (X \T )∩v(M ′2+ ...+
M ′t+M
′
1) 6= ∅. However, given that (X \T )∩v(M ′1) = ∅ by construction and
that for all x ∈ (X \ T ), x 6∈M ′j for all j ∈ {2, ..., t}, it follows from the first
part of Consistency in Voters that (X \T )∩ v(M ′2+ ...+M ′t+M ′1) = ∅. This
is a contradiction and, therefore, v(Mi) ∈ {{Mi}, {X}} whenever |Mi| ≥ |X|2 .
(ii) Suppose that |Mi| < |X|2 . Consider any profile M ′ such that X 6=
M ′i ⊇ Mi and |M ′i | > |X|2 , which is obviously possible. By the former case,
v(M ′i) ∈ {{M ′i}, {X}}; that is,M ′i ⊆ v(M ′i). Hence,Mi∩v(M ′i) =Mi. So, we
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can apply Contraction to obtain that Mi ⊆ v(Mi). Hence, v(Mi) 6= (X \Mi)
whenever |Mi| < |X|2 .
We can deduce from part (i) and (ii) that v(Mi) 6= (X\Mi). Thus, it
remains to be shown that for all profiles M and all individuals i, j ∈ N such
that |Mj| ≥ |Mi| and v(Mi) = X, v(Mj) = X. Suppose otherwise; that is,
v(Mj) = Mj. Take any profile M
′ such that |M ′j| = |Mi| and M ′j ⊆ Mj. By
Neutrality and Anonymity, v(M ′j) = X. Now, since M
′
j ∩ v(Mj) = M ′j, we
can apply Contraction to obtain that M ′j ⊆ v(M ′j) ⊆ v(Mj). But this cannot
be because v(Mj) =Mj ⊂ X = v(M ′j). ¤
From now on, let p ∈ [0, |X|) be any real number that satisfies the im-
plications of Lemma 1. We show in Lemma 2 that any alternative that does
not receive any support is not elected (except when no alternative receives
any support of size lower than p).
Lemma 2 Suppose that the family of voting rules v satisfies Consistency
in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, Contraction, and No-Veto. Then, for all
profiles M and electorates N such that Gy(MN) = 0 for some y ∈ X and
Gk(MN , x) > 0 for some x ∈ X and k ≤ p, y 6∈ v(MN).
Proof: Take any v that satisfies the hypothesis of the Lemma. Let the profile
M and the electorate N be such that there exists an individual i ∈ N such
that |Mi| ≤ p and x ∈ Mi. Then, by Lemma 1, v(Mi) = Mi. Now, we have
two possibilities: If N = {i}, it is obvious that y 6∈ v(Mi). Suppose therefore
that N 6= {i}. Given that y 6∈ v(Mi) and Gy(MN) = 0, it follows from the
first part of Consistency in Voters that y 6∈ v(Mi +MN\{i}) = v(MN). ¤
Proof of Theorem 1: It is immediate to see that any Size Approval Voting
satisfies Consistency in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, Contraction, and No-
Veto. Therefore, consider any family of voting rules v that satisfies these
properties. We have to show that there exists a vector of weights w =
(wk)k≤|X|, with wk ∈ R+ and wk ≥ wk+1 for all k ∈ {1, ..., |X|−1}, such that
for all profiles M ∈ (2X)N and all electorates N , x ∈ v(MN) ⇔
∑|X|
k=1wk ·
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Gk(MN , x) ≥
∑|X|
k=1wk · Gk(MN , y) for all y ∈ X. To do so, we consider
different cases.
(A) Suppose that for all profiles M and all electorates N , v(MN) = X.
Then, the vector of weights w = (w1, ..., w|X|) has to be such that wj = 0 for
all j = 1, ..., |X|.
(B) Suppose that there exists a profile M and an electorate N such that
v(MN) 6= X. We divide the corresponding analysis into four subcases and
analyze the restrictions different response profiles impose on the weights. It
follows from Lemma 1 together with the second part of Consistency in Voters
that we can exclude from our considerations all individuals that approve more
than p alternatives. Hence, the weights wp+1, ..., w|X| have to be zero.
(1) Let the response profile MN be such that |Mi| = 0 for all i ∈ N . By
the definition of v, v(MN) 6= ∅. Then, by Neutrality, v(MN) = X. It is
obvious that this situation does not impose any additional restriction on the
weights. Because of this case and the second part of Consistency in Voters we
can also ignore in the rest of the analysis all individuals that do not approve
any alternative.
(2) Let the response profile MN be such that |Mi| = k for all i ∈ N for
some 0 < k ≤ p. We consider two subcases. (a) Suppose that Mi ∩Mj = ∅
for all i, j ∈ N . By Lemma 2, any alternative x 6∈ ⋃i∈N Mi does not belong
to v(MN). Since all individuals approve the same number of alternatives
we can apply Neutrality to obtain that v(MN) =
⋃
i∈N Mi. (b) If there are
two individuals i, j ∈ N such that Mi ∩Mj 6= ∅, consider a set of maximal
sub-electorates N1, . . . , Nn. Since this partition of N is constructed in such
a way that every alternative receives from every sub-electorate at most one
vote, we obtain from the same argument as before that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
v(MNj) =
⋃
i∈Nj Mi. By construction, there exists also a non-empty set
of alternatives which receives one vote from every sub-electorate; that is,⋂
i∈{1,...,n} v(MNi) 6= ∅. Hence, we can apply the second part of Consistency
in Voters to see that v(MN) =
⋂
i∈{1,...,n} v(MNi). Both parts, (a) and (b),
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are consistent with our construction of weights if and only if wi > 0 for all
i ∈ {1, ..., p}.
(3) Let the response profile MN be such that |Mi| ∈ {1, k} for all i ∈ N
and some 1 < k ≤ p. Suppose first that Gk(MN , xi) = Gk(MN , xj) for all
i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and G1(MN , x1) + Gk(MN , x2) = |N | (the conditions
state that the electorate is divided into individuals who either vote for x1
or the set {x2, ..., xk+1}). Now, consider the profile M ′ and the electorate
N ′ such that Gk(M ′N ′ , xi) = G
k(M ′N ′ , xj) for all i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1}, and
G1(M ′N ′ , x1)+G
k(M ′N ′ , x2) = |N ′|. In both response profiles, given Neutrality
and the fact that alternatives without any support cannot be elected by
Lemma 2, we have only three possible images of v: the singleton {x1}, the
set {x2, . . . , xk+1}, and the set {x1, x2, . . . , xk+1}. This observation allows us
to prove two important claims.
Claim 1 For all profilesM,M ′ and electorates N,N ′ such that Gk(MN , xi) =
Gk(MN , xj) and G
k(M ′N ′ , xi) = G
k(M ′N ′ , xj) for all i, j ∈ {x2, ..., xk+1},
G1(MN , x1) +G
k(MN , x2) = |N |, and G1(M ′N ′ , x1) +Gk(M ′N ′ , x2) = |N ′|,
(i) if Fx2,x1(MN ; k, 1) = Fx2,x1(M
′
N ′ ; k, 1), then v(MN) = v(M
′
N ′);
(ii) if Fx2,x1(MN ; k, 1) < Fx2,x1(M
′
N ′ ; k, 1) and {x2, . . . , xk+1} ⊆ v(MN),
then v(M ′N ′) = {x2, . . . , xk+1};
(iii) if Fx2,x1(MN ; k, 1) > Fx2,x1(M
′
N ′ ; k, 1) and x1 ∈ v(MN), then v(M ′N ′) =
{x1}.
Proof: Consider any two profiles M and M ′ and electorates N and N ′ that
satisfy the hypothesis of the Lemma. Now, take two electorates A and B of
the sizes G1(M ′N ′ , x1) · |N | and G1(MN , x1) · |N ′|, respectively. Let M¯A and
M¯B be two response profiles obtained by replicating G
1(M ′N ′ , x1)-times the
response profileMN andG
1(MN , x1)-times the response profileM
′
N ′ . Namely,
the response profile M¯A is the union of G
1(M ′N ′ , x1)-isomorphic copies ofMN
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(denoted by M¯At with t ∈ {1, ..., G1(M ′N ′ , x1)}) and the response profile M¯B
is the union of G1(MN , x1)-isomorphic copies of M
′
N ′ (denoted by M¯Br with
r ∈ {1, ..., G1(MN , x1)}), where all At and all Br are disjoint. Then, for all
i ∈ {2, ..., k + 1}, Gk(M¯A, xi) = Gk(MN , x2) ·G1(M ′N ′ , x1) and Gk(M¯B, xi) =
Gk(M ′N ′ , x2) ·G1(MN , x1).
(i) It follows from the assumptions that G1(M¯A, x1) = G
1(MN , x1) ·
G1(M ′N ′ , x1) = G
1(M¯B, x1) and, for all i ∈ {2, ..., k + 1}, Gk(M¯A, xi) =
Gk(M¯B, xi). Since all alternatives receive the same number of votes from indi-
vidual approvals of the same size at M¯A and M¯B, we obtain from Anonymity
that v(M¯A) = v(M¯B).
We also obtain from Anonymity that for all t ∈ {1, ..., G1(M ′N ′ , x1)} and
all r ∈ {1, ..., G1(MN , x1)}, v(M¯At) = v(MN) and v(M¯Br) = v(M ′N ′). Then,
by iterating on the second part of Consistency in Voters,
v(M¯A) = v
G1(M ′N′ ,x1)∑
t=1
M¯At
 = G1(M ′N′ ,x1)⋂
t=1
v(M¯At) = v(MN)
and
v(M¯B) = v
G1(MN ,x1)∑
r=1
M¯Br
 = G1(MN ,x1)⋂
r=1
v(M¯Br) = v(M
′
N ′)
Consequently, it must be the case that v(M ′N ′) = v(MN).
(ii) It follows from the assumptions that G1(M¯A, x1) = G
1(MN , x1) ·
G1(M ′N ′ , x1) = G
1(M¯B, x1) and, for all i ∈ {2, ..., k + 1}, Gk(M¯A, xi) <
Gk(M¯B, xi). Now, take two response profiles MˆC and MˆD corresponding to
the disjoint electorates C and D, with the property that for all xi ∈ X and
j ∈ {1, ..., |X|}, Gj(MˆD, xi) = Gj(M¯A, xi) and Gj(MˆC , xi) = Gj(M¯B, xi) −
Gj(M¯A, xi). By Anonymity, v(MˆD) = v(M¯A) and v(MˆC + MˆD) = v(M¯B).
By the iterated application of the second part of Consistency in Voters and
Anonymity, v(M¯A) = v(MN) and v(M¯B) = v(M
′
N ′). Hence, v(MˆD) = v(MN)
and v(MˆC + MˆD) = v(M
′
N ′).
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Since at the response profile MˆC , G
k(MˆC , xi) = G
k(MˆC , xj) for all al-
ternatives i, j ∈ {2, ..., k + 1}, Gk(MˆC , xl) = 0 for all l 6∈ {2, ..., k + 1}, and
Gl(MˆC , xi) = 0 for all xi ∈ X and l 6= k, we have that v(MˆC) = {x2, ..., xk+1}
by case (B.2) and the fact that k ≤ p. Since {x2, ..., xk+1} ⊆ v(MN) by as-
sumption and we have already seen before that v(MN) = v(MˆD), v(MˆC) ∩
v(MˆD) = {x2, ..., xk+1}. This implies that v(MˆC + MˆD) = {x2, ..., xk+1} by
the second part of Consistency and Voters. Finally, since we have estab-
lished earlier that v(MˆC + MˆD) = v(M
′
N ′), we can conclude that v(M
′
N ′) =
{x2, ..., xk+1}.
(iii) The proof is similar to the one of part (ii). Thus, it is omitted. ¤
Claim 2 There exist two profiles M,M ′ and two electorates N,N ′ such that
(i) Gk(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj) ∈ (0, |N |) and Gk(M ′N ′ , xi) = Gk(M ′N ′ , xj) ∈
(0, |N ′|) for all i, j ∈ {x2, ..., xk+1}, (ii) G1(MN , x1)+Gk(MN , x2) = |N | and
G1(M ′N ′ , x1) + G
k(M ′N ′ , x2) = |N ′|, and (iii) v(MN) = {x1} and v(M ′N ′) =
{x2, . . . , xk+1}.
Proof: Consider the profile M which is such that M1 = {x2, . . . , xk+1} and
Mi = {x1} for all i 6= 1. By Lemma 1 and k ≤ p, v(M1) = {x2, . . . , xk+1}
and v(Mi) = {x1} for all i 6= 1. Then, by No-Veto, we know that there exists
t ∈ N such that x1 ∈ v(M2 + . . . +Mt +M1). Now, since v(Mt+1) = {x1},
we can apply the second part of Consistency in Voters in order to see that
v(M1+ ...+Mt+1) = {x1}. Using a similar reasoning we can prove that there
exists a sufficiently large sequence of individuals such that at the response
profile M ′N ′ where M
′
1 = {x1} and M ′i = {x2, ..., xk+1} for all i 6= 1, the set
of elected alternatives is {x2, ..., xk+1}. ¤
With the help of Claim 1 and 2, we are now able to construct all strictly
positive weights wk, k ≤ p. This is done in the following claim. Observe that
the vector of weights w has one degree of freedom. Hence, we can normalize
w1 ≡ 1 without loss of generality.
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Claim 3 For all k ≤ p, there exists a strictly positive weight wk ∈ R++
such that for all profiles M and all electorates N with the property that
Gk(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj) for all i, j ∈ {2, ..., k + 1} and G1(MN , x1) +
Gk(MN , x2) = |N |, x ∈ v(MN) if and only if G1(MN , x) + wk ·Gk(MN , x) ≥
G1(MN , y) + wk ·Gk(MN , y) for all y ∈ X.
Proof: We are going to divide our analysis in four cases. Remember that
for response profiles MN satisfying the hypothesis of this claim, v(MN) ∈
{{x1}, {x1, ...., xk+1}, {x2, ..., xk+1}} by Neutrality and Lemma 2.
(i) Suppose that the family of voting rules v is such that for all profilesM
and all electorates N with the property that Gk(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj) for
all i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k+1} and G1(MN , x1)+Gk(MN , x2) = |N |, v(MN) = {x1}.
This contradicts Claim 2 and, therefore, this case cannot be.
(ii) Suppose that the family of voting rules v is such that for all profiles
M and all electorates N with the property that Gk(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj)
for all i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and G1(MN , x1) + Gk(MN , x2) = |N |, v(MN) =
{x2, . . . , xk+1}. This contradicts Claim 2 and, therefore, this case cannot be.
(iii) Suppose that the family of voting rules v is such that for some profiles
M and some electorates N with the property that Gk(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj)
for all i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and G1(MN , x1) + Gk(MN , x2) = |N |, v(MN) =
{x1, x2, . . . , xk+1}. Now, take any other profile M ′ and any other electorate
N ′ such that Gk(M ′N ′ , xi) = G
k(M ′N ′ , xj) for all i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and
G1(M ′N , x1)+G
k(M ′N , x2) = |N ′|. If Fx2,x1(M ′N ′ ; k, 1) = Fx2,x1(MN ; k, 1), then
v(M ′N ′) = {x1, x2, . . . , xk+1} by the first part of Claim 1. If Fx2,x1(M ′N ′ ; k, 1) <
Fx2,x1(MN ; k, 1), then v(M
′
N ′) = {x2, . . . , xk+1} by the second part of Claim
2. Finally, if Fx2,x1(M
′
N ′ ; k, 1) > Fx2,x1(MN ; k, 1), then v(M
′
N ′) = {x1} by the
third part of Claim 2. Hence, it has to be the case that wk = Fx1,x2(MN ; 1, k).
(iv) Suppose that the family of voting rules v is such that for all profiles
M and all electorates N with the property that Gk(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj)
for all i, j ∈ {2, . . . , k + 1} and G1(MN , x1) + Gk(MN , x2) = |N |, v(MN) 6=
{x1, x2, . . . , xk+1}. By Claim 2, there exist two response profiles M¯A and MˆB
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(both satisfying the hypothesis of the Claim) such that v(M¯A) = {x1} and
v(MˆB) = {x2, . . . , xk+1}. It follows now from part (ii) and (iii) of Claim 1, No-
Veto, and the fact that {x1} and {x2, . . . , xk+1} are the only possible images
of v that inf{Fx1,x2(MN ; 1, k) : v(MN) = {x1}} = sup{Fx1,x2(MN ; 1, k) :
v(MN) = {x2, . . . , xk+1}} = δk. Hence, it has to be the case that wk = δk.
Observe that wk is an irrational number. ¤
So far, we have shown that if all individuals either vote for x1 or the set
{x2, . . . , xk+1}, then v is a Size Approval Voting with respect to the vector
of weights w = (1, w2, . . . , w|X|), where wk ∈ R++ for all k ∈ {2, . . . , p} and
wl = 0 for all l > p. In the final step of this part of the proof we have to
show that the constructed weights can be applied at any arbitrary response
profile MN satisfying the property |Mi| ∈ {1, k} for all i ∈ N . We start with
a claim showing that all alternatives that do not receive the maximal sum of
weighted votes are not elected.
Claim 4 For all profiles M and all electorates N such that |Mi| ∈ {1, k} for
all i ∈ N and x 6∈ argmax
y
{
G1(MN , y) + wk ·Gk(MN , y)
}
, x 6∈ v(MN).
Proof: Consider a profileM and an electorate N such that G1(MN , x)+wk ·
Gk(MN , x) > G
1(MN , y)+wk ·Gk(MN , y). We have to show that y 6∈ v(MN).
To see this, partition the electorate N into six sub-electorates, denoted by
A1, . . . , A6. We have that i ∈ A1 if and only if {x, y} ⊆Mi, A2 is a maximal
set such that there exists a bijection p : A2 → A2 satisfying Mi = {x} and
Mp(i) = {y} (intuitively, A2 is a maximal subset in which every individual
votes for either only x or for only y and the number of votes is the same for
both alternatives), A3 = {i ∈ N : {x, y} ∩Mi = ∅} contains all individuals
that neither vote for x nor for y, A4 is a maximal set such that there exists
a bijection p : A4 → A4 such that p(i) 6= i for all i ∈ A4, {x} ( Mi, and
{y} ( Mp(i) (intuitively, this set is constructed in the very same way as A2,
only that we consider individuals that vote for k alternatives), A5 = {i ∈ N :
|Mi| = k and i 6∈ (A1 ∪ A3 ∪ A4)} contains the remaining individuals that
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vote for k alternatives and approve either x or y, and, finally, A6 = {i ∈ N :
|Mi| = 1 and i 6∈ (A2 ∪ A3)} is obtained in the very same way as A5 only
that we consider the individuals that vote exactly for either x or y.
Suppose that all subsets are non-empty (otherwise, the proof works out
similarly). It follows directly from part (B.2) of this proof that {x, y} ⊆
v(MA1) and v(MA2) = {x, y}. Now, we treat the electorates A5 and A6
jointly. If x ∈ Mi for all i ∈ (A5 ∪ A6), then v(MA5 + MA6) = {x} by
the second part of Consistency in Voters. Otherwise, consider a profile M ′
and an electorate B of size |A5| · |A5 + A6|. In particular, let the response
profile M ′B be A5-isomorphic copies of the response profile (MA5 + MA6).
Now, partition the electorate B in |A5| sub-electorates such that in ev-
ery MBi , with i ∈ {1, . . . , |A5|}, there are |A6| individuals approving ex-
actly one alternative and |A5| individuals who approve the same k alterna-
tives. Since, by construction, G1(MN\(A5∪A6), x) + wk · Gk(MN\(A5∪A6), x) =
G1(MN\(A5∪A6), y)+wk ·Gk(MN\(A5∪A6), y) and, by assumption, G1(MN , x)+
wk · Gk(MN , x) > G1(MN , y) + wk · Gk(MN , y), it has to be the case that
G1(M ′Bi , x) + wk · Gk(MB′i , x) > G1(MB′i , y) + wk · Gk(M ′Bi , y) for all i ∈
{1, . . . , |A5|}. Now, since we have already seen before that v behaves as
a Size Approval Voting with vector of weights w at every response profile
MN such that G
k(MN , xi) = G
k(MN , xj) for all i, j ∈ {x2, . . . , xk+1} and
G1(MN , x1) + G
k(MN , x2) = |N |, we can conclude that x ∈ v(M ′Bi) and
y 6∈ v(M ′Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |A5|}. Consequently, x ∈
⋂|A5|
i=1 v(M
′
Bi
) and
y 6∈ ⋂|A5|i=1 v(M ′Bi). Now, we can deduce from the second part of Consistency in
Voters that x ∈ v(M ′B) and y 6∈ v(M ′B). Finally, applying this condition again
iteratively together with Anonymity yields that v(M ′B) = v(MA5 + MA6).
Therefore, x ∈ v(MA5 +MA6) and y 6∈ v(MA5 +MA6).
Now, if x ∈ v(MA4), then v(MA1) ∩ v(MA2) ∩ v(MA4) ∩ v(MA5 +MA6) =
{x}. Hence, by the second part of Consistency in Voters, v(MN\A3) = {x}.
Since y 6∈ Mi for all i ∈ A3, it follows from the first part of Consistency
in Voters that y 6∈ v(MN\A3 + MA3) = v(MN). If, however, x 6∈ v(MA4),
then y 6∈ v(MA4) by Neutrality. Consider the profile M¯ which is such that
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M¯Ai = MAi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and {M¯Ci}i∈N is a sequence of response
profiles such that M¯Ci is an isomorphic copy of MA2 and for all i, j ∈ N,
Ci ∩ Cj = Ci ∩ A2 = ∅. First, by Anonymity, v(M¯Ai) = v(MAi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} and v(M¯Ci) = {x, y} for all i ∈ N. Since v(M¯A4)∩ v(M¯Ci) = ∅
for all i ∈ N, we can apply No-Veto to obtain that there exists t ∈ N such
that {x, y} ∩ v(M¯C1 + . . . + M¯Ct + M¯A4) 6= ∅. Then, by Neutrality, we have
that {x, y} ⊆ v(M¯C1 + . . . + M¯Ct +MA4). Now, it follows from second part
of Consistency in Voters that v(M¯C1 + . . . + M¯Ct + M¯N\A3) = {x}. Since
v(M¯C1 + . . . + M¯Ct) = {x, y}, y 6∈ v(M¯N\A3) also by the second part of
Consistency in Voters (if it was the case that y ∈ v(M¯N\A3), then we would
have that y ∈ v(M¯C1 + . . . + M¯Ct + M¯N\A3); but this cannot be because
we have already seen that x is the only elected alternative at this response
profile). Consequently, y 6∈ v(M¯N\A3 + M¯A3) = v(M¯N) by the first part of
Consistency in Voters. Thus, y 6∈ v(MN). ¤
We finish the third part of the proof by showing that for all profiles
M and all electorates N such that |Mi| ∈ {1, k} for all i ∈ N , v(MN) =
argmax
y
{
G1(MN , y) + wk ·Gk(MN , y)
}
. If only one alternative receives the
maximal weighted sum, then it is uniquely elected by Claim 4 and the fact
that the image cannot be empty. Suppose therefore that at least two al-
ternatives, x and y, receive the maximal weighted sum and y 6∈ v(MN).
Take another profile M ′ which is such that M ′1 = {y} and there exists a
succession of disjoint electorates {Ni}i∈N with the property that M ′Ni is an
isomorphic copy of MN . We have that v(M
′
1) = M
′
1 and v(M
′
Ni
) = v(MN)
for all i ∈ N by Anonymity. Moreover, by No-Veto, there exists some t ∈ N
such that v(MN) ∩ v(M ′N1 + . . . +M ′Nt +M ′1) 6= ∅. But, by construction,
alternative y has the unique maximal weighted sum at the response profile
(M ′N1 + . . .+M
′
Nt
+M ′1). Thus, v(M
′
N1
+ . . .+M ′Nt +M
′
1) = {y}. Therefore,
v(MN)∩v(M ′N1+ . . .+M ′Nt+M ′1) = ∅ by assumption. This is a contradiction
and concludes the proof of part (B.3).
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(4) Consider any profile M and any electorate N . In the same spirit as
before, we are going to prove first that if
∑|X|
k=1wk · Gk(MN , x) >
∑|X|
k=1wk ·
Gk(MN , y), then y 6∈ v(MN). To see this divide the electorate N in three
sub-electorates: i ∈ N1 if and only if {x, y} ∩Mi = ∅, N2 = {i ∈ (N \N1) :
|Mi| > p}, and N3 = (N \ ({N1 ∪ N2})). Then, v(MN2) = X by Lemma 1
and the second part of Consistency in Voters. Given the vector of weights
w = (1, w2, . . . , w|X|) obtained in part (B.3), construct the vector of rational
numbers q = (1, q2, . . . , q|X|) in the following way: For all j = 2, . . . , p, (i)
qj = wj whenever wj ∈ Q, (ii) qj = wj+ε whenever wj 6∈ Q andGj(MN3 , y) ≥
Gj(MN3 , x), and (iii) qj = wj − ε if wj 6∈ Q and Gj(MN3 , y) < Gj(MN3 , x).
Additionally, qj = 0 for all j > p. Since the set of rational numbers is dense
in the set of real numbers, ε can be taken sufficiently small to guarantee
that
∑|X|
k=1 qk · Gk(MN , x) >
∑|X|
k=1 qk · Gk(MN , y). We write qj = ajbj , where
aj, bj ∈ N and there does not exist a common divisor of aj and bj.
Consider the profile M ′ and the electorate A of size |N3| ·
∏p
j=1 bj such
that M ′A consists of
∏p
j=1 bj isomorphic copies of MN3 . Consider more-
over the electorate B disjoint from A with the property that G1(M ′B, x) =
G1(M ′B, y) =
∑|X|
j=1 qj ·Gj(M ′A, x) and G1(M ′B, x) +G1(M ′B, y) = |B|. Obvi-
ously, v(M ′B) = {x, y}. Select a sub-electorate B1 from the electorate B such
thatG1(M ′B1 , x) =
∑|X|
j=1 qj ·Gj(M ′A, y) andG1(M ′B1 , y) =
∑|X|
j=1 qj ·Gj(M ′A, x).
Consider a partition of A, {Ak}|N3|k=1, and a related partition of B1, {Bk1}|N3|k=1,
satisfying the following conditions for any k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , |N3|}:
(i) |Ak| = |Ak′|;
(ii) i, j ∈ Ak ⇔Mi =Mj;
(iii) {x, y} ∩ Mi = {x} for all i ∈ Ak ⇔ Mj = {y} for all j ∈ Bk1 and
|Bk1 | = qt ·
∏p
j=1 bj, where t = |Mi| for all i ∈ Ak;
(iv) {x, y} ∩ Mi = {y} for all i ∈ Ak ⇔ Mj = {x} for all j ∈ Bk1 and
|Bk1 | = qt ·
∏p
j=1 bj, where t = |Mi| for all i ∈ Ak;
(v) {x, y} ⊆Mi for all i ∈ Ak ⇔ there exists a bijection ρ : Bk1 → Bk1 such
that ifMj = {x},Mρ(j) = {y} and |Bk1 | = 2 ·qt ·
∏p
j=1 bj, where t = |Mi|
for all i ∈ Ak.
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Given the construction of the partitions, we have, by the application of
Case (B.3), that x ∈ v(M ′Ai +M ′Bi1) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |N3|}. Then, we can
apply the second part of Consistency in Voters to see that x ∈ v(M ′B1 +
M ′A). By construction, G
1(M ′B\B1 , x) > 0 and G
1(M ′B\B1 , y) = 0. Then,
v(M ′B\B1) = {x}. Hence, by the second part of Consistency in Voters, v(M ′A+
M ′B) = {x}. Applying the second part of Consistency in Voters, we obtain
that y 6∈ v(M ′A) (if it was the case that y ∈ v(M ′A), then y ∈ v(M ′A)∩ v(M ′B)
and, by the second part of Consistency in Voters, y ∈ v(M ′A+M ′B); but this
cannot be because we have already seen before that v(M ′A +M
′
B) = {x}).
Since v(M ′A) consists of isomorphic copies of MN3 , y 6∈ v(MN3). Then, by the
first part of Consistency in Voters, y 6∈ v(MN).
Following the very same argument as in part (B.3), one can finally show
that all alternatives for which the weighted sum is maximal must belong to
the image of the voting rule. This concludes the proof of part (B.4).
So far, we have shown that there exists a vector of weights w = (wk)k≤|X|,
with wk ∈ R+, such that v is a Size Approval Voting relative to w. Hence,
it remains to be shown that the weights are weakly decreasing; that is wk ≥
wk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , |X| − 1}. First, if k ≥ p, the result follows from
the fact that wl = 0 for all l > p. In continuation suppose that there exists
a k < p such that wk+1 > wk. Consider the profile M and the electorate
N = {1, 2} such that x ∈ M1, M1 ∩ M2 = ∅, and |M1| = |M2| = k + 1.
Then, x ∈ v(MN) by Case (B.2). Consider now the response profileM ′N such
that M ′2 = M2 and M
′
1 = (M1 \ {y}) with y ∈ Mi and y 6= x. Then, since
wk+1 > wk by assumption, x 6∈ v(M ′N). However, since x ∈ (M ′1∩ v(MN)) by
construction, it follows from Contraction that M ′1 ∩ v(MN) ⊆ v(M ′N). This
is a contradiction and, therefore, wk ≤ wk+1. ¤
5 Independence
The following examples prove that the properties are independent.
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Consistency in Voters (1): Let q = (1, q2, . . . , q|X|) be a vector of weights
such that 1 > qi−1 > qi > 0 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , |X| − 2}, and q|X|−1 = qX =
−1. Let the family of voting rules v be such that for all profiles M and
all electorates N , x ∈ v(MN) if and only if
∑|X|
k=1 qk ·Gk(MN , x) ≥
∑|X|
k=1 qk ·
Gk(MN , y) for all y ∈ X. This family satisfies the second part of Consistency
in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, Contraction, and No-Veto. The following
example shows that it does not satisfy the first part of Consistency in Voters.
Let X = {x, y, z} and suppose that the response profile MN is such that
M1 = {x} and M2 = {x, y}. Then, v(M1 +M2) = {z}. Since v(M1) = {x}
and z 6∈ v(M2) the first part of Consistency in Voters would imply that
z 6∈ v(M1 +M2).
Consistency in Voters (2): Let n ≥ 2 be any natural number. Let the family
of voting rules v be such that for all profiles M and all electorate N of size
|N | < n and Gy(MN) > 0 for some y ∈ N , x ∈ v(MN) if and only if
Gx(MN) 6= 0. Otherwise, apply Approval Voting. This family satisfies the
first part of Consistency in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, Contraction, and
No-Veto. The following example shows that it does not satisfy the second
part of Consistency in Voters. Let n = 3 and X = {x, y, z}. Moreover,
suppose that the response profile MN is such that M1 = M3 = {x, y} and
M2 = M4 = {x, z}. Then, v(MN) = {x}. But since v(M1 +M2) = v(M3 +
M4) = {x, y, z}, the second part of Consistency in Voters would imply that
v(MN) = {x, y, z}.
Anonymity: Assign to each individual i ∈ N a weight qi ≥ 1 in such a way
that qi 6= qj for some pair i, j ∈ N. Now, let the family of voting rules v
be such that all profiles M and all electorates N , x ∈ v(MN) if and only if∑
i∈N :x∈Mi qi ≥
∑
i∈N :y∈Mi qi for all y ∈ X. This family satisfies Consistency
in Voters, Neutrality, Contraction, and No-Veto. The following example
shows that it is not anonymous. LetX = {x, y} and suppose thatN = {1, 2}.
Moreover, let q1 = 2 and q2 = 1. If M1 = M
′
2 = {x} and M ′1 = M2 = {y},
then v(M1 +M2) = {x} and v(M ′1 +M ′2) = {y}. Anonymity would imply
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that v(M1 +M2) = v(M
′
1 +M
′
2).
Neutrality: Assign to each alternative xi ∈ X a strictly positive weight qi in
such a way that qi 6= qj for some pair xi, xj ∈ X. Now, let the family of
voting rules v be such that all profiles M and all electorates N , x ∈ v(MN)
if and only if qx ·Gx(MN) ≥ qy ·Gy(MN) for all y ∈ X. This family satisfies
Consistency in Voters, Anonymity, Contraction, and No-Veto. The following
example shows that it is not neutral. Let X = {x, y} and suppose that
N = {1, 2}. Moreover, let qx = 2 and qy = 1. If M1 = {x, y}, then
v(M1) = {x}. Define the permutation µ : X → X to be such that µ(x) = y
and µ(y) = x. Then, v(µ(M1)) = {x} and µ(v(M1)) = {y}. Neutrality
would imply that µ(v(M1)) = v(µ(M1)).
Contraction: Let p = (p1, . . . , p|X|) be a vector of strictly positive weights
such that pi < pi+1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |X| − 1}. The family of voting rules v
is such that for all profiles M ∈ (2X)N, and all electorates N , x ∈ v(MN)⇔∑|X|
k=1 pk·Gk(MN , x) ≥
∑|X|
k=1 pk·Gk(MN , y) for all y ∈ X. This family satisfies
Consistency in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, and No-Veto. The following
example shows that it does not satisfy Contraction. Let X = {x, y, z, w}
and N = {1, 2}. Suppose two response profiles MN and M ′N ′ such that
M1 = {x, y} = M ′1, M2 = {z, w} and M ′2 = {z}. Then, v(MN) = X and
v(M ′N ′) = {x, y}. Contraction would imply that z ∈ v(M ′N ′).
No-Veto: Let the family of voting rules v be such that x ∈ v(MN) if and
only if there does not exist j < |X| and y ∈ X such that (i) Gj(MN , y) >
Gj(MN , x) and (ii) G
k(MN , y) ≥ Gk(MN , x) for all 1 ≤ k < j. This family
satisfies Consistency in Voters, Anonymity, Neutrality, and Contraction. The
following example shows that it does not satisfy No-Veto. Let X = {x, y, z}
and suppose that the response profile is such thatM1 = {x} andMi = {y, z}
for all i ≥ 2. Then, v(M1 +M2 + . . . +Mp) = {x} for all p ≥ 2. No-Veto
would imply that there exists an integer p ≥ 2 such that v(M1 +M2 + . . .+
Mp) ∩ {y, z} 6= ∅.
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